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patches, and restarting operating systems and applications. However, in mission critical systems













A software bug is weakness in a computer program either by code or design that produces an
incorrect or unexpected result, or causes it to behave in unintendedways (Garfinkel, 2007). The
research question regards the value of these vulnerabilities for antiforensic hacks or the
implications for the preservation and presentation of evidence (Hilley, 2007). Exploiting software
bugs can occur inmany ways. The focus of our interest was fuzzing exploitations. Fuzzing is the
processofprovidingintentionallyinvaliddatatoanapplicationinanattempttotriggeranerroror
fault condition of some kind. This type of activity can be classified as antiforensic as the
consequencescanblockevidence,counterfeitevidence,confoundinvestigation,frustrateprocesses,
and confuse analysis. Code execution is an integral part of software tool functionality and the
associated vulnerabilities require securing.We used fuzzing to create malformed data structures
throughmethodssuchasrandomlyreplacingsinglebytes.Initssimplestformfuzzingcanconsistof
simplyrandomlyreplacingbytes inadatastructure;at itsmostadvanced it requiresmanipulating




documentswith thegoalofdetectingproblemswith thebuilt in fileviewers in the forensic tools.
Fuzzing was also performed on file system structures in an attempt to reveal issues with the




is the process ofmodifying specific portions of a data structure guided with detailed knowledge
















of service attacks and fragile heuristics (Lui & Stach, 2006). The tools risk of improper input
validation before performing a process leads to a common example of a technique that exploits
softwarebyabufferoverflow.Abufferoverflowoccurswhenaprogramiswritingdatatoabufferin
memorybutoverrunsthebuffersboundaryandoverwritestheadjacentmemoryarea.Theresultof
buffer overflow is that the programmay exhibit erratic behaviour including crashes andmemory
accesserrors.Incaseswherethedatabeingwrittentomemoryisundercontroloftheuseritmay
bepossiblefortheusertocontrolwhatcodeiscurrentlybeingexecutedandtoexecutetheirown




deviceand thenanalyse, searchanddisplay thousandsofdifferentdata formats (Charters,2009).
Denialofserviceattacksalsooccurwithtoolsandrefertotheabilityofanattackertoexhaustan
availableresourceofmemoryandCPUtime.Oncetheresourcehasbeenexhaustedthentheservice
provided by tool is deniedmeaning the specific forensic analysis task being performed stops. An
exampleof adenialof serviceattack againstdigital forensic tools that is commonly referred to is
“42.zip”. 42.zip is a small zip file that is 42KB in size; however 42.zip containsmultiple levels of







signature analysis it first examines the file extension and file header and then performs a
comparisonwithalistofknownsignatures.Theriskofrelyingonheuristicprocessesisthattheycan
beeasilycircumventedbytoolssuchasTransmogrifyinordertohidefiles.Thereisalsotheriskofa




working effectively or could divert the investigators attention from legitimate zip files containing
relevantevidence(Carrier,2002).

Tool related riskscanbemitigated through twomainapproaches; firstly theuseofmultiple tools
andsecondlytheproductionofbettertools.Theuseofmultipletoolsisasimplesolutionhowever
the cost in time and money of purchasing tools, training and performing the same work twice
prohibitsmanyinvestigatorsfrombeingabletousemultipletools.Themonetarycostfactorcanbe




digital forensic tools to perform a task which results in tools sharing common methods and
techniques;theendresultbeingmultipletoolsthatarevulnerabletothesamedenialofserviceand
fragile heuristic attacks.Many antiforensic techniques can be overcome by improving and fixing
53 
 
bugs inexistingdigital forensic tools.Denialofserviceattackssuchas theuseof42.zipshouldbe
intelligently detected and handled by all tools. The heuristic systems behind processes like file
signature analysis can be improved by looking beyond the header and footer of a file and the




We tested a range of proprietary and open source tools by adopting best practices from the












Fail Criticallyunacceptable H4: Software bugs are detected that present a critical
antiforensicrisk.

The acceptance spectrums contained a range of possible outcomes for each test case beyond a
simple pass or fail result and further refinements weremade to granulate (see Tables 2 & 3). A
numberofreferencesetswerecreatedbyfirst identifyingabenigninputfile forasubfunction.A
referencesetwas thengeneratedbycreatinganumberofmalformed filesbasedoffof the input
file.Thebenign fileswereeither taken fromanexisting imageof forensiccorporaorbymanually
creatingbenign filesand in thisway thereferencesetsall containvariousnumbersof filesat five
specificmalformation percentages being 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.5%, 1% and 2%. A range ofmalformation
percentageswaschosentogenerateawiderangeofpossiblemalformationsinthereferencesets.


































EC.EP.03 The “Expand Compound Files” subfunction shall be able to handle
malformedcompoundfileswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition
EC.EP.04 The “Find Internet Artifacts” subfunction shall be able to handle
malformedinternetartefactswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition
EC.EP.05 The “Windows Artifact Parser” subfunction shall be able to handle
malformedWindowsartefactswithoutgeneratinganerrorcondition








forensic tools. The outcome shows that the tool performs inconsistently and across the different




butdisturbinglya greaternumberofoccurrences reportedproblems for theuninterrupteduseof
the tool.These includedahighnumberofcrashes indicating thatabstractcomplexities thatcould
notberesolvedbythesoftware.Inadditionbufferoverrunswerefoundinlargefilesandanumber













Furtheranalysis showedthat throughout the testing therewere fourdistinct typesof issueswere
identified.  Themost common typeof issue seenwas a complete crash resulting in theWindows
operating system presenting an error message. The error message indicates that the operating
systemhasdetecteda fatalexceptionhasoccurred in the toolexecutable.Windowsperformeda
memory dump of the application’s memory and then ended the executable.  A crash has the






the executable. In this particular case it remained in working state with reduced functionality.
However,testingwasabandonedduringtestcaseTC.02whileprocessingreferencesetRSEMAIL04
due to thecreationofunusually largecache files. In thecaseofRSEMAIL04 the logicalevidence
files being createdwere exceptionally large. The issue seenwithRSEMAIL04 is likely due to the


















forensic implications. Theacceptance spectrumresultdoesnothing to inform investigators if they
shouldbe concernedaboutaparticular softwarebug. For exampleoneof thebugswasanalysed
furtherandshowntobeacodeexecutionvulnerabilitywhiletherestofthebugsremainedasminor
risks. Care should be taken to understand if a risk has been accurately represented or if further
analysiscoulddetermineiftheriskhasbeenunderoroverstated.

The most prevalent issue identified in the case was seven instances of crashing where the tool
suffereda fatal error that it couldn’t recover from.Two instancesof the similar issuesof internal
errors and exiting unexpectedly were also identified. A suspect knowing they are about to be




































Themost obvious risk factor is a tool risk that was due to a failure to validate data. The digital
forensic tool has failed to validate the data it is processing from the compound file and this has




however these counter measures are dependent on human risk factors and an investigator who
hadn’tencounteredsimilarissuesbeforemightsimplykeeprerunningthetoolandexpectittowork
thesecondtime.Thesoftwarebugsidentifiedthatcausedacrash,unexpectedexitorinternalerror
presentanantiforensicriskthat iseasily identifiablebyan investigator.Whenthetoolcrashes in
themiddleofrunningtheEvidenceProcessorit’sobviousthatsomethinghasgonewrongandsome
actionneedsbetakentoremedythesituation.Therewasonesoftwarebugidentifiedthatisn’tas
obvious. The “Find Email” function of the Evidence Processor results in the creation the of large
cachefiles.The“FindEmail”functionparsesemailcontainerfilesandextractstheindividualemails
out toa logical evidence file toallow for furtheranalysis.A softwarebugwas identifiedwith the






toa crash in that the investigator losesa significantamountof time.However the lossof time is




falls into the categoryof denialof serviceattackswhere the investigator is beingprevented from
usingaresource.Thesoftwarebugsidentifieddonotcurrentlyposeasignificantthreattoevidential
integrity or the security of examinermachines.Although theremay bepotential formore severe











resulted in unusual behaviour from different tools including behaviours that prevented evidence
acquisition,crashingwhilesearchingordisplayingincorrectevidenceaswellasevidencenotbeing
displayed.

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